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A LITTLE KNOWLEDGE MAY BE DANGEROUS,
BUT ABSENCE OF KNOWLEDGE MAY LEAD
TO CRIMINAL PENALTIES: UNITED
STATES v. HOFLIN 880 F.2d 1033
(9th Cir. 1989)
The criminal law in Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence aims to
punish those whom society considers to be culpable.' Cognizant of the
stigma associated with a criminal conviction, and loth to impose sanc-
tions on an innocent person, courts require that defendants possess
some degree of scienter before passing judgments of guilt.2 A legisla-
ture, however, may exercise its police power to eliminate the mens rea
element of a criminal offense.3 When enacting criminal statutes defin-
ing crimes involving regulating food contaminants,4 obscene material,5
drugs and narcotics,6 weapons and explosives,7 and pollutants,' gov-
1. United States v. Marvin, 687 F.2d 1221, 1226 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1081 (1983). See also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-51 (1952)
(relationship between mental element and punishment is instinctive).
2. Marvin, 687 F.2d at 1226. See also United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,
438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978) ("the existence of a mens rea is the rule of... the principles of
. .criminal jurisprudence." (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500
(1951))); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251-53 (1922) (scienter is necessary to
indict and prove criminality at common law, even if not included in statutory
definition).
3. Balint, 258 U.S. at 251-52. See also United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 546 F.
Supp. 713, 720 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (legislature's power to exclude knowledge requirement
"cannot ... be questioned" (quoting Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. United States, 220 U.S.
559, 578 (1910))), aff'd, 703 F.2d 62 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 829 (1983); cf.
United States v. Flores, 753 F.2d 1499, 1505 (9th Cir. 1985) (Congress will include
specific intent language if it intends to require proof of willful conduct).
4. See, eg., United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672-78 (1975) (Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act regulating food contamination).
5. See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152 (1959) (municipal ordinance
regulating possession of obscene material).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943) (Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act regulating drug labeling and content); Balint, 258 U.S. at 251
(Anti-Narcotic Act regulating narcotic sales); United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280,
285 (1922) (same). See infra notes 36-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Dotterweich.
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ernments on occasion have dispensed with mens rea requirements to
better combat threats to the public welfare posed by these items.9 Un-
fortunately, legislative drafters do not always particularize mens rea
requirements for various crimes within vast regulatory schemes. The
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 197610 (RCRA) expressly
declares that the state of mind necessary for many of its criminal provi-
sions is "knowing." 11 It is unblear, however, whether Congress in-
tended for the criminal intent requirement to attach to all of the
RCRA for proscribed offenses.12 In United States v. Hoflin,13 the
Ninth Circuit held that a person who disposes of hazardous waste
without a permit violates 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A) 14 despite his lack
7. See, e.g., United States v. Flores, 753 F.2d 1499, 1502 (9th Cir. 1985) (Federal
Gun Control Act regulating firearm shipments).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d 1123, 1128 (3d Cir. 1979)(Federal Water Pollution Control Act regulating pollutant discharge), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1074 (1980).
9. Balint, 258 U.S. at 251-52. See also Harris, Cavanaugh & Zisk, Criminal Liabil-
ity for Violations of Federal Hazardous Waste Law: The "Knowledge" of Corporations
and Their Executives, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 203, 215 (1988) (presumption of crim-
inal intent element is less forceful in the context of "public welfare" offenses). For a
definition of "public welfare" offense, see infra note 62.
10. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580,
§ 3008(d), 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992i (West 1983 &
Supp. 1990)) [hereinafter RCRA]. See infra notes 29-33 and accompanying text dis-
cussing RCRA's purpose.
11. For the text of RCRA § 6928(d), see infra note 14.
12. See generally Harris, Cavanaugh & Zisk, supra note 9.
13. 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denie,,ll0 S. Ct. 1143 (1990). Hoflin was
the Director of Public Works for the City of Ocean Shores, Washington. Id. at 1035.
See infra notes 16-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of the facts.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) provides:
Any person who-
(1) knowingly transports or causes to be transported any hazardous waste iden-
tified or listed under this subchapter to a facility which does not have a permit
under this subchapter or pursuant to title I of the Marine Protection, Research,
and Sanctuaries Act...
(2) knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste identified or
listed under this subchapter -
(A) without a permit under this subchapter or pursuant to title I of the
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act... ; or
(B) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of sugh
permit; or
(C) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of any ap-
plicable interim status regulations or standards;
(3) knowingly omits material information or makes any false material statement
or representation in any application, label, manifest, record, report, permit, or
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol40/iss1/11
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of knowledge that no disposal permit had been obtained.' 5
During his tenure as Director of the Public Works Department of
Ocean Shores, Washington, 6 the defendant in Hoflin ordered an em-
other document filed, maintained, or used for purposes of compliance with regula-
tions promulgated by the Administrator (or by a State in the case of an authorized
State program) under this subchapter;
(4) knowingly generates, stores, treats, transports, disposes of, exports, or other-
wise handles any hazardous waste or any used oil not identified or listed as a haz-
ardous waste under this subchapter (whether such activity took place before or
takes place after the date of the enactment of this paragraph) and who knowingly
destroys, alters, conceals, or fails to file any record, application, manifest, report, or
other document required to be maintained or filed for purposes of compliance with
regulations promulgated by the Administrator (or by a State in the case of an au-
thorized State program) under this subchapter;
(5) knowingly transports without a manifest, or causes to be transported with-
out a manifest, any hazardous waste or any used oil not identified or listed as a
hazardous waste under this subehapter required by regulations promulgated under
this subchapter (or by a State in the case of a State program authorized under this
subchapter) to be accompanied by a manifest;
(6) knowingly exports a hazardous waste identified or listed under this sub-
chapter (A) without the consent of the receiving country or, (B) where there exists
an international agreement between the United States and the government of the
receiving country establishing notice, export, and enforcement procedures for the
transportation, treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous wastes, in a manner
which is not in conformance with such agreement; or
(7) knowingly stores, treats, transports, or causes to be transported, disposes of,
or otherwise handles any used oil not identified or listed as a hazardous waste
under this subchapter -
(A) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of a permit
under this subchapter; or
(B) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of any ap-
plicable regulations or standards under this chapter.
shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not more than $50,000 for each day of
violation, or imprisonment not to exceed two years (five years in the case of a
violation of paragraph (1) or (2)), or both. If the conviction is for a violation com-
mitted after a first conviction of such person under this paragraph, the maximum
punishment under the respective paragraph shall be doubled with respect to both
fine and imprisonment.
Id.
15. Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1039. Finding that knowledge of the absence of a permit
was not an essential element of the offense, the court stressed that omitting "knowl-
edge" as a required element was consistent with RCRA's goals. Id. at 1038. See infra
notes 29-33 and accompanying text for additional discussion of RCRA's purpose and
goals.
16. Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1035. Hoflin held this position from 1975 to 1980, at which
point he left for two years for personal reasons. Id. He returned in 1982 as Assistant
Director, and in 1983, regained his position as Director. Id. As Director, Hoflin's
responsibilities included supervising road maintenance and sewage treatment plant op-
eration. Id.
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ployee to dispose of and bury fourteen drums containing excess liquid
road paint17 on the city's sewage treatment plant premises.18 The de-
fendant gave that order disregarding the plant director's warning 19 that
such conduct might jeopardize the plant's National Pollutant Dis-
charge Elimination System certificate.2" Approximately two years
later, in March 1985, the plant director informed state authorities, who
inspected the plant and then referred the matter to the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA).21 The EPA subsequently recovered the
drums, but not before paint had leaked into the soil.22 The EPA tested
samples taken from the drums23 and determined that the materials
were of a type disposable only at a facility possessing an EPA permit.2
4
The treatment plant in question did not possess such a permit.25 Based
upon the EPA's evidence, a grand jury indicted Hoffin for disposing of
17. Id. From 1975 to 1982, the city purchased 3500 gallons of road paint for main-
tenance jobs. Id. Once the road crews completed the painting jobs, they returned the
55-gallon drums containing paint to the Public Works Department's yard. Id. The
Public Works Department either reused or gave away the empty drums. Id. In 1982,
Hoflin's successor, John Hastig, stored 14 of the drums inside a building at the yard.
Id. The Fire Marshal, however, ordered Hastig to store the drums outside because they
created a risk of explosion. Id. Hoflin was aware of the Fire Marshal's orders. Id.
18. Id. City employees, at Hoflin's behest, dug a hole on the treatment plant
grounds in which to bury the 14 drums. Id. Some of the drums were rusty and leaky.
Id. In order for the drums to fit inside the hole, the city employees crushed the drums
with a front-end loader. Id. During the process, at least one drum burst. Id. The
employees then covered the drums with sand. Id.
19. Prior to issuing the burying orders, Hoflin announced to Fred Carey, the sewage
treatment plant director, that he planned to bury the 14 drums on plant grounds. Id.
Carey informed Hoflin that burying the drums could cause the issuing authority to
revoke the plant's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) certifi-
cate. Id.
20. Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1035. Any person desiring to discharge pollutants directly
into the United States' navigable waters must obtain a NPDES certificate. Id. at 1035
n.l. The EPA Administrator or an EPA authorized state agency issues the certificate
pursuant to the Clean Water Act. Id. (citing the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342
(1977)).
21. Id. at 1035.
22. Id. Some of the drums the EPA found did not have lids or were crushed. Id.
Ten of the drums contained liquid material. Id.
23. Id. The EPA samplings indicated a high flash point of 65 degrees Fahrenheit.
Id.
24. RCRA deems substances with flash points of 140 degrees Fahrenheit or less
hazardous. Id. (citing EPA Characteristics of Hazardous Waste, 40 C.F.R. § 261.21
(1989)). A person may dispose of these hazardous substances only at facilities which




paint without a permit in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A).2 6 At
trial, the jury found Hoflin guilty of substantially the same charges.27
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict,
and held that knowledge of a facility's permit status is not required for
conviction under 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A).2 8
Congress enacted RCRA to regulate disposal of the growing volume
of hazardous and toxic waste produced by American industry.29 Con-
gress viewed disposal of toxic materials as a serious national problem30
and concluded that the grave danger which hazardous materials posed
to the public required a "greater degree" of regulation than did non-
hazardous waste.3 1 In order to deter improper waste disposal, Con-
gress promulgated enforcement provisions which included criminal
penalties.3 2 Subsequent to RCRA's enactment, Congress amended the
statute in 1978 and 1980 to expand the criminal provision and to ele-
26. Id. at 1036. Count II charged Hoflin with disposing of the paint without a
permit in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A) and regulations issued pursuant to
RCRA. Id. See supra note 14 for the text of 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A). The grand
jury also indicted Hoflin on two other counts. Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1036. Count I
charged him with conspiracy to dispose of hazardous waste without a permit in viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 18 U.S.C. § 371. Id. Count III charged Hoflin with disposing
of sludge on the plant grounds in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1).
27. Id. The jury found Hoflin guilty on Counts II and III. Id. The district court
suspended sentencing and placed Hoflin on two years probation. Id.
28. Id. at 1039.
29. Id. at 1038. RCRA was enacted to provide "nationwide protection against the
dangers of improper hazardous waste disposal." H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d
Seas., pt. 1, at 11 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1491], reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 6238, 6249 (increasing volumes of hazardous waste have the potential
to "blind, cripple or kill" members of the public).
30. Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1038. See also S. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1,
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5019 (legislative history of the
RCRA 1980 amendments discussing the health danger to the general public which the
hazardous waste creates); H.R. REP. No. 1491, supra note 29, at 3-4, reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6238, 6241.
31. Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1038 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (b)(5)). RCRA was also an
attempt to provide "a multifaceted approach towards solving the problems associated
with the 3-4 billion tons of discarded materials generated each year, and the problems
resulting from the anticipated 8% annual increase in the volume of such waste." H.R.
REP. No. 1491, supra note 29, at 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 6238, 6239.
32. "[JIustification for the penalties section is to permit a broad variety of mecha-
nisms so as to stop the illegal disposal of hazardous wastes." United States v. Johnson
& Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 667 (3d Cir. 1984) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1491, supra
note 29, at 31, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6238, 6269), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985). In addition to the criminal penalties set forth in
1991]
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vate section 6928 violations from misdemeanors to felonies. 33
As with RCRA, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 34 pro-
vides criminal penalties for violators of its shipping requirements. 35
The Supreme Court interpreted the Act's criminal provisions in United
States v. Dotterweich,36 in which the Government charged Dotterweich
and his pharmaceutical company with shipping adulterated and mis-
branded drugs.37 Although Dotterweich's misconduct was not inten-
tionally undertaken, the Court upheld his conviction.38 The Court first
noted that Congress, when promulgating the Act, intended to prevent
the shipment of adulterated and misbranded drugs in interstate com-
merce39 in order to protect the public consumers.' The Court then
§ 6928(d), RCRA also enumerates several penalties in § 6928(g) and compliance orders
in § 6928(a).
33. Harris, Cavanaugh & Zisk, supra note 9, at 224 n.136. See also Johnson &
Towers, 741 F.2d at 667 (the fact that Congress has twice amended RCRA's criminal
provisions to broaden their scope and enhance the penalty from misdemeanors to felo-
nies indicates Congress' awareness of the seriousness of the proscribed conduct). See
infra notes 76-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of Johnson & Towers.
34. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-393 (1988).
35. The Act prohibits, inter alia, "the introduction or delivery for introduction into
interstate commerce of any... drug... that is adulterated or misbranded." 21 U.S.C.
§ 331(a) (1988). Any person who violated the provision was guilty of a misdemeanor.
21 U.S.C. § 333(a) (1940) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(1) (1988)).
36. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
37. Id. at 278. The defendant company was a jobber in drugs. Id. After purchas-
ing the drugs from a manufacturer, the company repacked the drugs under its own label
and shipped them in interstate commerce. Id.
38. Id. at 285. Ajury convicted Dotterweich on two counts of shipping misbranded
drugs and one count of shipping an adulterated drug in interstate commerce. Id. at 278.
The jury acquitted the pharmaceutical company on all three counts. Id. The Second
Circuit reversed Dotterweich's conviction finding the company the only "person" sub-ject to prosecution under the Act. Id. at 279. See United States v. Buffalo Pharmacal
Co., Inc., 131 F.2d 500, 503 (2d Cir. 1942). The Supreme Court reversed the appellate
court decision. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 285.
39. Id. at 280. By enacting the Food and Drugs Act of 1906, Congress exerted its
power to prevent the shipment of impure and adulterated food and drugs in interstate
commerce. Id. With the Act of 1938, Congress extended its control over "illicit and
noxious articles" and exacted stiffer penalties for Act violations. Id.
40. The legislative history of the Act of 1938 demonstrates Congress' concern for
protecting the consuming public from the dangers associated with the articles' distribu-
tion. Id. at 282. The House Committee stated that the Act "seeks to set up effective
provisions against abuses of consumer welfare growing out of inadequacies in the Food
and Drugs Act of June 30, 1906." Id. at 282 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 2139, 75th Cong.,
3d Sess., pt. 1). Similarly, the Senate Committee reported that the new legislation
"must strengthen and extend that law's protection of the consumer." Id. (quoting S.
REP. No. 152, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1).
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reasoned that after balancing the danger the articles posed to the public
against the needs of the supplier, Congress appropriately omitted a
mens rea requirement and assigned the responsibilities and risks of
drug misidentification to the shipper.4" Although recognizing that the
statute effectively criminalized innocent conduct, the Court found the
inherent hazards of the regulated, shipped items justified any hardship
the statute imposed on the shippers.4 2
The Supreme Court applied the Dotterweich balancing approach in
United States v. Freed.43 In Freed, the defendant was indicted for pos-
sessing and conspiring to possess hand grenades' which had not been
registered pursuant to the National Firearms Act.4 The Court found
that the criminal provision did not require that one who receives or
possesses a firearm have the specific intent to acquire an unregistered
firearm or knowledge of the firearm's registration status.46 Finding
firearms inherently dangerous,4 7 the Court opined that Congress could
41. The statute under which Dotterweich was convicted was the type of legislation
whereby penalties serve as effective means of regulation. Such legislation dispenses
with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct-awareness of some wrong-
doing. In the interest of the larger good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon
a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public danger.
Id. at 280-81 (citing United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922)).
42. Id. at 284-85. Noting that Congress may dispense with the consciousness of
wrongdoing requirement even if drastic consequences result, the Court stated:
Hardship there doubtless may be under a statute which thus penalizes the transac-
tion though consciousness of wrongdoing be totally wanting. Balancing relative
hardships, Congress has preferred to place it upon those who have at least the
opportunity of informing themselves of the existence of conditions imposed for the
protection of consumers before sharing in illicit commerce, rather than to throw
the hazard on the innocent public who are wholly helpless.
Id. But see id. at 286-87 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (the Court should not impose individ-
ual liability on corporate officers without Congress' clear intent to do so).
43. 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971).
44. Id. at 601.
45. 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1988). The statute under which Freed was indicted made
it unlawful for any person "to receive or possess a firearm which is not registered to him
in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record." Freed, 401 U.S. at 604
(quoting 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (Supp. V 1964)).
46. Id. at 607. But see id. at 612 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan argued
that even though the Act does not require the prosecutor to prove the possessor's
knowledge that the grenades are unregistered, the Act does mandate that the prosecutor
prove knowing possession of the items and knowledge that the items possessed were
hand grenades. Id. In Justice Brennan's view, therefore, the Act does not completely
dispense with the knowledge element. Id.
47. Id. at 609.
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justifiably regulate firearm possession by not including a knowledge or
intent requirement.48 Cognizant of the legitimate public safety con-
cern, the Supreme Court hence deferred to Congress' choice to omit a
scienter component from the statute.4 9
The Court has extended the balancing approach beyond those regu-
latory statutes at issue in Dotterweich and Freed into the context of
prosecutions under environmental laws. In United States v. Interna-
tional Minerals & Chemical Corp.5 (IMC), the Supreme Court upheld
Interstate Commerce Commission regulations governing the transpor-
tation of hazardous materials5 1 which did not require proof that the
transporter knew of the regulation.5 2 In IMC, the Government
charged the defendant with transporting hazardous materials without
including classification information on the shipping papers as re-
quired.5" Focussing on the cargo's extremely dangerous nature, the
48. Id. at 610 (quoting United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 253-54 (1922)). Cf.
Balint, 258 U.S. at 254 (regulation of narcotics sales is justified because of risks they
pose to innocent purchasers); United States v. Flores, 753 F.2d 1499 (9th Cir. 1985)
(regulation of firearms distribution is necessary for citizen safety); United States v.
Flum, 518 F.2d 39, 45 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (regulation of firearm possession on
aircraft is necessary for passenger safety), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
49. Freed, 401 U.S. at 609-10. Noting the public safety interest, the Court theorized
that "one would hardly be surprised to learn that possession of hand grenades is not an
innocent act." Id. at 609.
50. 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
51. Id. at 559 (construing 18 U.S.C. § 834(a) (repealed 1979)). Section 834(a) em-
powered the Interstate Commerce Commission to promulgate regulatory regulations
ensuring the "safe transportation" of "corrosive liquids." Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 834(a)). Congress also enacted a statute stating that whoever "knowingly violates any
. . . regulation" created under § 834(a) shall be penalized. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 834(f) (repealed 1979)).
52. IMC, 402 U.S. at 563. Although the Court noted that Congress did not intend
to create strict liability for a regulatory violation, it doubted that Congress was also
"carving out an exception to the general rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse."
Id. at 562-63 (construing S. REP. No. 901, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1959) and H.R.
REP. No. 1975, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 10-11, reprinted in 1960 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3351). The Court added that the principle that ignorance of the law is
no defense applies to both statutory and regulatory enactments. Id. at 563. Cf. United
States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360 (1973) (willful violation entails knowledge of a legal
duty to comply with statutory tax obligations); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225,
228-29 (1957) (conviction of felon for failing to register requires proof of knowledge of
obligation to register).
53. IMC, 402 U.S. at 559. Congress required any party transporting regulated
"hazardous material" to indicate on the shipping papers the material's name and classi-




Court found the likelihood of government regulations in this case suffi-
ciently probable to justify presuming the carrier's awareness of their
existence.5 4 Thus, the company's lack of knowledge concerning the
transportation regulations did not excuse it from failing to maintain the
required records.55
The Court, however, did not impose absolute liability upon the vio-
lators.56 Rather, the Court interpreted the statutory term "knowingly"
as requiring the shipper to know that the cargo was dangerous before
any liability attached." The term "knowingly" thereby refers to
awareness of the cargo's nature, as opposed to the existence of the par-
ticular regulation.5"
Liparota v. United States59 presented the Supreme Court with an-
other opportunity to interpret the term "knowingly" as included in a
statute.6° In Liparota, the Government charged Liparota with know-
54. Analogizing the acids to the drugs in Balint and the grenades in Freed, the
Court concluded that the acids' inherent danger was sufficient to put a shipper on notice
of the probability of the existence of enforcement regulations. Id. at 564-65. Although
the Court distinguished these hazardous items from pencils, dental floss and paper clips,
it did indicate that this latter group of articles might also become subject to government
regulation. Id. The Court stated, however, that because these items are not inherently
dangerous, a person shipping them cannot be presumed to be aware of any governing
regulations. Id. at 564-65. Therefore, as to these items, failure of Congress to require
mens rea "might raise substantial due process questions." Id. Cf. United States v.
Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971) (one must realize that possession of hand grenades is
not an innocent or an unregulated act); United States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442, 453
(D.C. Cir, 1989) (conduct inherently dangerous raises presumption of regulations).
55. IMC, 402 U.S. at 565. Under the Court's analysis, if the carrier knew the cargo
was hazardous and failed to comply with the labeling regulations, the Government may
hold the shipper accountable even if the shipper was unaware of the regulation's exist-
ence. Id. at 563-64. As an example, the Court stated that a shipper, who, in good faith,
transported dangerous acid innocently believing that it was spring water would not fall
within the Act's purview. Id.
56. See supra note 52 for a discussion of Congress' intent to impose strict liability
for regulatory violation.
57. IMC, 402 U.S. at 563. Although it found the shipper's awareness of the regula-
tion unnecessary, the Court stated that in order to convict the shipper the Government
must prove the shipper was aware of the shipped materials' dangerous nature. Id. See
also supra note 53.
58. In doing so, the Court excused good faith mistakes of fact. The Court noted
that by requiring the possessor of the material to "know" the item was hazardous, Con-
gress had retained a raens rea requirement. IMC, 402 U.S. at 563-64. This application
of "knowingly" protects against overly harsh results and provides the statute with a
minimal knowledge requirement.
59. 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
60. The Court's analysis focused on the Food Stamp Act of 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1)
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ingly possessing food stamps in a manner not authorized by the Food
Stamp Act.61 The Court held that because the violation did not
threaten community health or safety, the illegal conduct in question
was not a "public welfare" offense.62 Accordingly, the Court required
the prosecution to prove that the defendant knew the Food Stamp Act
prohibited his possession of the food stamps.
63
The Court distinguished its interpretation of the term "knowingly"
in Dotterweich, 4 Freed,65 and IMC 66 from its interpretation in
Liparota on the basis of whether the respective regulated articles were
(1977). The Act imposed criminal penalties on any person who "knowingly uses, trans-
fers, acquires, alters, or possesses coupons or authorization cards in any manner not
authorized" by statute or regulation. Id. at 419 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1)).
61. Id. at 421. Frank Liparota co-owned a sandwich shop in Chicago which the
Department of Agriculture had not authorized to accept food stamps. Id. The Govern-
ment proved at trial that Liparota had on multiple occasions purchased food stamps
from an undercover Department of Agriculture agent for an amount less than their face
value. Id. Liparota was ultimately indicted for acquiring and possessing food stamps in
violation of the Act. Id.
62. Id. at 432-33. The Court defined "public welfare" offenses in Morissette v.
United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) as crinles which "depend on no mental element but
consist only of forbidden acts or omissions." Morisette, 342 U.S. at 252-53. The
Court, in Liparota, noted that the instances in which it had previously recognized "pub-
lic welfare" offenses involved "a type of conduct that a reasonable person should know
is subject to stringent public regulation and may seriously threaten the community's
health or safety." Liparota, 471 U.S. at 433. See, eg., United States v. Holland, 810
F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (drug trafficking within close proximity of school constitutes
a "public welfare" offense); cf United States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(lobbying not deemed a "public welfare" offense). Courts cite the extreme care which
the public welfare laws promote as one advantage of the strict liability the laws essen-
tially impose. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 433 U.S. 422, 441 n.17.
63. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 433. The Court opined, however, that its holding did not
place an undue burden on the Government. Id. at 433-34. The Government did not
need to demonstrate that Liparota knew of the specific regulations governing food
stamp acquisition and possession. Id. at 434. See supra note 52 discussing the principle
that ignorance of the law is not a defense to a statutory or regulatory offense. More-
over, the Government was not required to present evidence conclusively establishing
Liparota's state of mind. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 434. The Court stated that the Govern-
ment could prove that Liparota knew his conduct was illegal or unauthorized by refer-
ring to the surrounding facts and circumstances. Id. Accord United States v. Cruz-
Valdez, 773 F.2d 1541 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (permitting use of circumstantial evi-
dence to infer knowledge from presence of large amount of contraband on vessel);
United States v. Bums, 597 F.2d 939, 942-45 (5th Cir. 1979) (allowing inference of
guilty knowledge from fact of unexplained possession of recently stolen property).
64. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of Dotterweich.
65. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of Freed.
66. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of IMC.
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inherently dangerous and hazardous to community health and safety.67
Although the food stamps at issue in Liparota raise issues of public
concern, they do not pose the same threat of harm or injury to an
unsuspecting public as do drugs, firearms and hazardous materials. 8
Unlike the defendant Liparota's conduct, the patently dangerous ac-
tions discussed in Dotterweich, Freed and IMC warranted imposing a
presumption that the defendants knew of the regulations existence.69
Because the Court did not view food stamp acquisition and possession
as inherently dangerous activities, ° it refused to dispense with the
mens rea element of the offenses.7 Furthermore, the Court concluded
that to interpret the statute as omitting a mens rea requirement would
effectively criminalize too broad of a range of possibly innocent
conduct.7 2
67. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 433. The Court was unwilling to compare foods stamps to
the hand grenades in Freed. Id. Nor was the Court willing to analogize unauthorized
food stamp acquisition and possession to the adulterated and misbranded drug sales in
Dotterweich. Id.
68. Id. at 423-33. The distinction between these cases is clear. Grenades, narcotics
and drugs, and hazardous wastes are inherently dangerous items. Food stamps are in-
nocuous. See also United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558
(1971) (comparison of drugs, grenades, and acid to pencils, dental floss, and paper
clips); United States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (the common denomi-
nator in these cases is that the matter regulated is inherently dangerous). For a discus-
sion of the court's awareness of the need for regulations governing the shipment of
dangerous articles shipped in interstate commerce, see supra note 54.
69. Liparta, 471 U.S. at 432-33.
70. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
71. Although recognizing that Congress did not "explicitly and unambiguously"
indicate whether the statutory definition included a mens rea element, the Court was
unwilling to deviate from "the background assumption of our criminal law" that crimi-
nal offenses require a mens rea element. Id. at 426. "[More than the simple omission
of the appropriate phrase from the statutory definition is necessary to dispense with an
intent requirement." Id. (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S.
422, 438 (1978)). See also supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text discussing the pur-
pose of and need for scienter as an element of an offense at common law.
72. Id. The Court theorized that to read the statute with no "knowledge-of-illegal-
ity" requirement would, for example, render criminal a food stamp recipient who un-
knowingly purchased food from a store who charged the general public less than a food
stamp recipient. Id. A similar reading of the statute would also render criminal a non-
recipient who mistakenly possessed the stamps because of the Department of Agricul-
ture's inadvertent administrative error. Id. at 426-27. But see id. at 435 (White, J.,
dissenting). Justice White interpreted the term "knowingly" to modify only "uses,
transfers, acquires, alters and possesses." Id. To him, therefore, knowledge of illegal-
ity was not an element of the crime. Id. at 436. Cf United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S.
63, 69 n.6 (1984) ("knowingly and willfully" do not modify all elements of the statutory
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As with the congressional enactments at issue in the cases discussed
above, section 6928(d) of RCRA proscribes "knowing" participation in
various activities involving transportation, storage, treatment and dis-
posal of hazardous waste.73 Congress, however, provided minimal gui-
dance concerning the meaning of section 6928,74 preferring to leave the
defining process to the courts.75
The Third Circuit construed the term "knowing" in section
6928(d)(2)76 in United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc." and read a
scienter requirement into the statute.78 In Johnson & Towers, the Gov-
ernment charged the defendants with disposing of hazardous waste
without obtaining the required EPA permit.7 9 Although the statute
did not expressly require that the defendants know they were acting in
violation of the law,80 the court held that the Government must prove
under section 6928(d)(2)(A) that each defendant knew both that John-
son & Towers was required to obtain a permit and that the company
crime forbidding knowingly and willfully making false statements within a federal
agency's jurisdiction).
73. Harris, Cavanaugh & Zisk, supra note 9, at 220.
74. Id.
75. "The conferees have not sought to define 'knowing' for offenses under subsec-
tion (d); that process has been left to the courts under general principles." S. REP. No.
172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 39, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
5038.
76. Johnson & Towers is one of two appellate decisions construing § 6928(d). The
other case in which an appellate court interpreted the meaning of the provision was
United States v. Hayes International Corp., 786 F.2d 1499 (1 1th Cir. 1986). In Hayes,
the Government charged the defendants with unlawfully transporting hazardous waste
to a facility which did not have a permit. Id. at 1501. Hayes and its employee were
prosecuted under § 6928(d)(1), a different provision of § 6928 than the court addressed
in Johnson & Towers. Id.
77. 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985).
78. Id. at 669.
79. Id. at 664. The original indictment named Johnson & Towers and two of its
employees. Id. Johnson & Towers pleaded guilty to the indictment's three RCRA
counts. Id. The district court dismissed the RCRA counts charging the employees
after concluding that the RCRA criminal provisions apply only to "owners and opera-
tors" and that neither employee qualified as an "owner" nor an "operator." Id. The
Government appealed the dismissal to the Third Circuit. Id. The Third Circuit held
that the RCRA criminal provisions applied to the two employees after determining that
the potential class of defendants under the Act should not be limited to "owners" and
"operators." Id. at 664-67. The scope of this comment excludes a discussion of RCRA
owner and operator liability.
80. Id. at 668. See supra note 14 for the text of § 6928 (d)(2).
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had not procured a permit."1
Although cognizant of the accepted practice of declining to read a
mens rea requirement 2 into a "public welfare" statute, 3 the court
found that section 6928(d)(2) required a knowledge element in both
subsections (A) and (13) for the sake of consistency. 4 The court ex-
81. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 669.
82. 741 F.2d at 668. See, eg., United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971) (uphold-
ing conviction for possession of unregistered hand grenades without proof of mens rea);
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280-81 (1943) (upholding conviction for
shipping adulterated and misbranded drugs without proof of mens rea); United States v.
Behrman, 258 U.S. 280, 288 (1922) (indictment under Narcotic Drug Act does not
require proof of knowledge or intent); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252-54
(1922) (upholding indictment for sale of opium and coca leaves derivatives without
proof of knowledge); United States v. Golitschek, 808 F.2d 195, 202-03 (2d Cir. 1986)
(overturning conviction for exporting military helicopters to Iran because Government
failed to show that defendant had knowledge of the specific requirements of the statute);
United States v. Schmitt, 748 F.2d 249, 251-54 (5th Cir. 1984) (upholding conviction
for gun possession holding that Congress omitted a requirement of specific intent from
the statute), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1104 (1985); United States v. Studna, 713 F.2d 416,
418-19 (8th Cir. 1983) (upholding conviction for altering automobile odometers holding
that the statute did not require intent; rather an act committed voluntarily and inten-
tionally in violation of a known legal duty is sufficient); United States v. Hussein, 675
F.2d 114, 115-16 (6th Cir.) (upholding conviction for entering the United States ille-
gally without proof of specific intent), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 869 (1982); United States v.
Mullens, 583 F.2d 134, 138-39 (5th Cir. 1978) (upholding conviction for accepting gifts
and bribes without proof of specific intent); United States v. Turcotte, 558 F.2d 893, 896
(8th Cir. 1977) (upholding conviction for gun possession after felony conviction holding
that for regulations of dangerous or harmful items, Congress will not be presumed to
have required scienter as an element of offense); McQuoid v. Smith, 556 F.2d 595, 598-
99 (1st Cir. 1977) (upholding conviction for firearm possession without valid license
requiring defendant be aware only that he possessed a weapon, thereby creating strict
liability for unlicensed gun carriers); United States v. Flum, 518 F.2d 39, 45 (8th Cir.)
(en banc) (upholding conviction for attempting to board aircraft with concealed weapon
without proof of intent to conceal), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); cf. United States
v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933) (tax laws require willful withholding of information to
constitute violation). But cf. United States v. Erne, 576 F.2d 212, 214-16 (9th Cir.
1978) (upholding conviction for failing to collect and deposit sufficient F.I.C.A. taxes
holding that specific intent was not an element of the offense).
83. After examining the statute's legislative history, the court concluded that by
enacting RCRA, Congress attempted to "control hazards that 'in the circumstances of
modem industrialism, are largely beyond self-protection.'" Johnson & Towers, 741
F.2d at 666-67 (quoting United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943)). See
supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of RCRA's legislative history;
see also supra note 62 for a definition of "public welfare" offenses.
84. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 668. The court noted that although policy justi-
fications might warrant omitting a mens rea requirement from the statute, it was con-
cerned that such an omission would render the statute "arbitrary and nonsensical." Id.
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plained that to support a conviction under subsection (B)8" the Gov-
ernment must prove that the defendant knowingly treated, stored or
disposed of hazardous waste in violation of a permit condition or re-
quirement.8 6 Further, the court found it unlikely that Congress would
allow the Government to successfully prosecute a person who acted
without a permit even if he was unaware of the facility's permit sta-
tus.87 Addressing the linguistic knot the statute presented, the court
determined that rather than inadvertently omitting the word "know-
ing" from subsection (A), Congress must have intended for the term
"knowing" introducing subsection (2) to modify subsection (A).88 In
the court's view, a contrary interpretation would criminalize actions of
those who acted without a permit, irrespective of their knowledge, 9
but would excuse those who violated conditions of their permit unless
their actions were committed knowingly. 90
In United States v. Hoflin,9 1 the Ninth Circuit declined to follow the
Third Circuit's interpretation of RCRA section 6928(d)(2)(A).92 In
Further, the court acknowledged that it should interpret statutes intended to protect the
public health so as to implement their regulatory purpose. Id. at 666.
85. See supra note 14 for the text of § 6928(d)(2)(B).
86. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 668.
87. Id. Cf. United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986).
Confronted with a similar linguistic problem of determining whether knowledge of a
facility's permit status was an element of a § 6928(d) offense, the court in Hayes found
that Congress intended that section to require knowledge of the permit status of the
facility. Id. at 1504. The court stated, "[r]emoving the knowing requirement from this
element would criminalize innocent conduct; for example, if the defendant reasonably
believed that the site had a permit, but in fact had been misled by the people at the site."
Id. (citing Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985)). See also Boyce Motor
Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 337 (1952) (defendant who willfully fails to deter-
mine a facility's permit status acts knowingly).
88. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 668-69 (citing United States v. Marvin, 687 F.2d
1221, 1226 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1081 (1983)). The court noted, how-
ever, that its conclusion that "knowingly" applied to subsection (A) did not overly bur-
den the Government. Id. at 669. The Government was required to prove only
knowledge of the actions taken, and not necessarily knowledge of the statute criminaliz-
ing them. Id. (citing United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S.
558, 563 (1971)).
89. Id. at 668 (construing 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A)).
90. Id. (construing 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(B)).
91. 880 F.2d 1033 (1989).
92. Id. at 1038. The court adhered to the fundamental principle of statutory con-
struction that statutory interpretations "which would render some words surplusage are
to be avoided." Id. (quoting In re Kun, 868 F.2d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 1989)).
"[A]dopt[ing] the Third Circuit's interpretation [in Johnson & Towers] of subsection
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Hoflin, the court determined whether knowledge of the facility's per-
mit status is an element of a section 6928(d)(2)(A) violation by way of
statutory analysis.93 Noting the absence of the term "knowing" in sec-
tion 6928(d)(2)(A) and its presence in section 6928(d)(2)(B),94 the
court found the statute indisputably distinguished treatment of persons
holding a permit from those not possessing a permit." Finding the
statute's language unambiguous, the court was unwilling to read
"knowingly" into subsection (A).96 Thus, the court ruled that knowl-
edge of the absence of a permit was not an essential element of a sub-
section (A) offense.97 The court reasoned that if Congress intended
another interpretation, then it easily could have inserted "knowingly"
into subsection (A).98 Therefore, to provide meaning to the presence of
"knowingly" in the introduction to section 6928(d)(2) and "knowing"
in section 6928(d)(2)(B), the court was compelled to recognize and give
effect to the terms conspicuous absence in subsection (A).9 9
The Hoflin court also found the omission of a knowledge require-
ment consistent with RCRA's purposes."°° The court stated that Con-
(A) would render the word 'knowing' in subsection (B) mere surplusage." Id. See
supra notes 79-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of United States v. Johnson &
Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984).
93. Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1036-37. Hoflin argued that the term "knowingly" in sub-
section (2) modified subsections (A) and (0. Id. at 1036. He believed, therefore, that
the court could uphold his conviction only if the prosecutor could prove that Hoflin had
known the company had not obtained a permit. Id. at 1036-37.
94. Id. at 1037. The court found that the absence of "knowing" in subsection (A)
was in "stark contrast" with its presence in subsection (B). Id.
95. Id. Noting that the statute creates a distinction between those persons holding
permits and those persons not holding permits, the court stated that subsection (B) only
applies to permit holders who knowingly violate a permit condition or requirement. Id.
To read the word "knowingly" from the introduction of subsection (2) into subsection
(A) would eviscerate the distinction. Id.
96. Id. Having viewed the statute's language "plain and its meaning clear," the
court concluded its statutory interpretation inquiry. Id. (quoting United States v. Pat-
terson, 820 F.2d 1524, 1526 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Burlington N. R.R. v. Oklahoma
Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987))).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1038. The court stated that had Congress intended to include a permit's
absence as an element of a subsection (A) defined offense, it could have done so. Id.
Congress specifically included a knowledge element in subsection (B) "notwithstanding
the 'knowingly' modifier which introduces subsection (2)." Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text discussing RCRA's legisla-
tive history.
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gress enacted RCRA in order to protect the public and the
environment from the risks of hazardous wastes.10 1 Recognizing this
inherent danger and the public's inability to protect itself,"0 2 the court
deemed it appropriate to presume that hazardous waste handlers know
of RCRA's various provisions.103  By imputing to waste handlers
knowledge of the regulation, the court reached its desired effect while
avoiding the temptation to assume the term "knowing" into subsection
(A).
1 0 4
Furthermore, the Hoflin court substantiated its interpretation on the
basis of RCRA's goals.10 ' The court explained that one of RCRA's
main concerns was to provide an enforcement mechanism whereby
hazardous waste handlers would provide the EPA with information
relating to the location of the hazardous waste from the time of its
generation through the time of its disposal.10 6 To exempt waste han-
dlers who are ignorant of the statute's permit requirements from com-
plying with the enforcement provisions would hinder the EPA's ability
101. Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1038. The court noted the considerable expense involved
in safely disposing of hazardous substances and the astounding volume of waste which
handlers dump yearly. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 1491, supra note 29, at 3-4, 11, re-
printed in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6238, 6240-41). The special dan-
gers the wastes pose warrants a "greater degree of regulation than does non-hazardous
solid waste." Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(5)).
102. Id. Analogizing RCRA to the Food and Drug Act which the Supreme Court
addressed in United States v. Dotterweich, the court found that RCRA was intended to
protect the public from the health hazards incident to "modem industrialism." Id.
(quoting United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943)). See supra notes 36-42
and accompanying text for a discussion of Dotterweich.
103. Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1038. Applying the principles the Supreme Court devel-
oped in IMC, the court stated, "Where... dangerous or deleterious devices or products
or obnoxious waste materials are involved, the probability of regulation is so great that
anyone who is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing with them must be
presumed to be aware of the regulation." Id. (quoting United States v. International
Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971)). See supra notes 50-58 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of IMC.
104. Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1038-39. Although knowledge of the absence of a permit is
unnecessary for a conviction under § 6928(d)(2)(A), knowledge that the waste disposed
of is hazardous is required. Id. at 1039.
105. Id. at 1038. See supra notes 29-33 discussing RCRA's purpose and goals.
106. Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1038. The statute affirmatively requires waste handlers to
provide information to the EPA in order to obtain a permit. Id. Placing this burden on
waste handlers enables the EPA to know waste handlers' identity, monitor their activi-
ties and enforce statutory compliance. Id. See also United States v. Protex Indus., Inc.,
874 F.2d 740, 745-46 (10th Cir. 1989) (RCRA imposes independent duty on drum re-




to perform its job."07 Further, such an exception would shield the han-
dler's activities from the regulating agency and severely handicap the
EPA's attempt to achieve RCRA's goals.108
The Hoflin court correctly declined to follow the Third Circuit's de-
cision in Johnson & Towers and properly applied the line of Supreme
Court cases interpreting scienter in public welfare statutes. °9 The
Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld and applied statutes that protect
the general public without imposing a restrictive knowledge require-
ment.110 In instances where the regulated industry poses a threat to
the public, Congress waives the traditional intent requirement 11' and
accepts that nonculpable individuals will be prosecuted as an unfortu-
nate, but necessary trade off to protect public health and safety.'12 In
practice, however, the risk of convicting the "innocent" is minimal be-
cause ignorance of government regulation in most instances would re-
quire extreme naivety." 3
The Johnson & Towers court incorrectly read words into section
6928(d)(2)(A) that Congress did not include. Such a reading does vio-
lence to the legislative purpose of the Act.114 The section's language is
not ambiguous. Therefore, courts must give proper effect to the ab-
sence of the word "knowing" in subsection (A) of section
6928(d)(2)." 5 Because those who dispose of hazardous waste without
a permit pose a greater danger to the public than those who dispose of
waste improperly under a permit, section 6928(d)(2)(A) makes sense in
its present, albeit clumsily drafted state.1 16 Unlike permit holders,
107. Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1038-39.
108. Id.
109. See supra notes 36-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases in which
the Supreme Court has interpreted statutes setting forth "public welfare" offenses.
110. See supra note 82 and accompanying text discussing cases in which the court
determined proof of knowledge or intent to be unnecessary.
111. Cf. supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text discussing the purpose of and need
for scienter as an element of an offense at common law.
112. See supra notes 39-42, 47-49, 54-55 and accompanying text illustrating the
courts' balancing of the public's need for protection against Congress' need to enact
effective legislation.
113. See supra notes 39-40, 47-48, 54, 103-04 and accompanying text listing exam-
ples of conduct, the nature of which, warrants regulation.
114. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text discussing RCRA's intended
purpose.
115. See supra notes 91-108 and accompanying text explaining the court's proper
interpretation of § 6928(d)(2).
116. United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1038-39 (9th Cir. 1989). Documented
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non-permit holders are not subject to EPA monitoring.1 17 The threat
from deadly environmental time bombs thus warrants suspending the
mens rea requirement. The Hoflin court's holding, that section
6928(d)(2)(A) does not require knowledge of the lack of a permit, bet-
ter comports with congressional intent and better protects the public
from non-regulated hazardous waste disposers.118
Patrick J. Ennis*
sources of hazardous waste pose a significant threat to public health. A fortiori,
§ 6928(d) must be enforced as written to prevent the even greater dangers which un-
identified waste handlers and undetected disposals present to society.
117. Id. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text discussing the effectiveness
of the EPA's enforcement mechanisms.
118. Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1038-39. See supra notes 91-107 and accompanying text
discussing the court's rationale.
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